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Albert Camus and the Anticolonials: Why Camus Would Not 
Play the Zero Sum Game1
James D. Le Sueur, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
In 1994, I returned from ParIs to Hyde Park just in time to catch a 
lecture about Albert Camus that an esteemed colleague, the late Tony 
Judt, was giving at the University of Chicago. I was much younger then, 
eager to engage in debate, and I had just spent most of the past two years 
turning over the recently opened pages of Camus’ private papers in 
Paris and trolling through the private papers of other prominent French 
intellectuals, as well as newly declassified state archives for what was to 
become my first book, Uncivil War.2 I had also done dozens of interviews 
with Camus’ friends and fellow travelers (Jean Daniel, Germaine Tillion, 
Jean Pélégri, etc.), as well as old adversaries (including Françis Jeanson). 
To the person, out of the many dozens of interviews I conducted, when 
asked about Albert Camus everyone agreed that he had died well before 
his time, that he was a deeply admirable and humane writer, and that he 
had paid much too heavy of a price for efforts to achieve a peaceful solu-
tion to the bloody drama in Algeria. Moreover, when I conducted these 
interviews throughout the 1990s, every single interviewee I spoke with, 
including Claude Levi-Strauss, Pierre Bourdieu, and Jacques Vergės, also 
admitted that they had all modified their stances on Algerian nationalism 
and were far more critical of their unchecked anticolonialism having 
seen its failures in Algeria.3 Finally, they all agreed that Camus could 
not be understood without foregrounding Algeria and decolonization in 
any reading of him. 
Yet, what they said about Camus contrasted remarkably with Judt’s 
statements. I cannot remember what set me off, but I knew that I did not 
understand or agree with what Judt was saying about Albert Camus. Part 
of my objection to Judt’s broader work on French intellectuals was the 
contrast between his emphasis on the Second World War and the Cold 
War and my own emphasis on decolonization. To be sure, decoloniza-
tion was then a new and emerging field, but, there was enough known to 
suggest that decolonization had transformed France and therefore Camus 
in fundamental and indisputable ways. Hence, decolonization’s role was 
not as minor as Judt had maintained. Legitimate and scholarly objections 
aside, I quite simply made a royal ass out of myself by criticizing him 
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so publically (something I later deeply regretted). This essay is a kind 
of posthumous apology to my colleague, Tony Judt. 
My visceral over-reaction to Judt’s talk 20 years ago reflects a continu-
ing Camus debate. Why do Albert Camus and decolonization, a distant 
historical figure on the one hand and an intricate historical process on 
the other, continue to ignite such spirited disagreement among friends 
and colleagues?
The PoliTics of a Zero sum Game
To begin, Albert Camus is not a minor intellectual figure in the history 
of twentieth-century France, intellectual history, or colonial history. He 
is and remains one of the most important intellectuals of the twentieth 
century. Therefore, what is said about him carries a certain gravitas. At 
the same time, he is also a very important figure in the history of French 
colonialism and decolonization in Algeria, and perhaps one of the most 
controversial. Nevertheless, our understanding of Albert Camus and 
the often nasty milieu of French intellectuals in which he circulated 
remains filtered through the lens of a zero sum game that is aberrated 
by many unexamined biases. Put simply, this zero sum world-view of 
French intellectuals in this contentious post-war period pitched one 
writer against another in often very public and very brutal debates. As 
a younger scholar, the high stakes intellectual game made perfect sense 
to me precisely because I was educated to play this assassins’ academic 
game at the University of Chicago. Intellectuals in France during de-
colonization played to win and they played for keeps, and the way to 
win was to destroy one’s opponent completely and publically. This is 
still true today, of course. 
Writers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, two of Ca-
mus’ closest equals (in terms of intellectual stature), played this game 
to perfection. As it became increasingly clear that Camus held different 
positions from them on their most valued abstractions such as revolution, 
Marxism and anticolonialism, intellectuals like Sartre and de Beauvoir 
became increasingly brutal with Camus, and increasingly ad hominem. 
They aimed at his Achilles’ heel: his settler roots in Algeria. Hence, what 
should been an advantage because he simply knew more about Algeria 
and North Africa than Sartre and de Beauvoir did together, became for 
them an identity to attack. However, well before they began to attack 
Camus in earnest, when Camus was a much better known and more 
respected writer than they, he began to record his ambivalence and 
Why Camus Would Not Play the Zero sum Game / Le Sueur 29
misgivings about the increasingly acidic tone of Sartre’s critiques. For 
example, on March 9, 1943, Camus noted in a letter to his friend and 
mentor, Jean Grenier: 
I received Cahiers du Sud. Sartre’s article is a model of 
“dismantling.” Of course, in every creation there is an intuitive 
element which he doesn’t envision. Intelligence doesn’t play such 
an unimportant part. But in criticism, it’s the rule of the game, 
and that’s just fine, since on several occasions he enlightened me 
about what I wanted to say. I also know most of his criticisms 
are fair, but why this acid tone?4
A decade later, during the French-Algerian War (1954–1962), Sartre 
and de Beauvoir became even more caustic. Their reputation had also 
grown after WWII, and they were peers. Despite or perhaps because of 
Camus’ international stature and his determination to find a peaceful 
solution to the Algerian crisis, Sartre and de Beauvoir evidenced a clear 
disdain for their former friend. By this time, anticolonialism had come 
in vogue, and this fit well with both their very honest concerns for hu-
man freedom and with their desire to highlight connections between a 
Marxist/socialist world-view and the emerging nationalist movements. 
Ironically, just as American policy-makers during the 1940s, 1950s, and 
1960s began to read these “Third World” revolts through the narrow 
lens of hegemonic Communism—something that led to foreign policy 
blunders by US presidents such as the 1953 CIA-MI6 coup d’état against 
Mohammed Mosaddegh in Iran, and the Bay of Pigs in 1961—radical 
anticolonial writers such as Sartre and de Beauvoir engaged in equally 
politicized and myopic appropriations of anticolonial movements as 
evidence of the emerging proletariat third world revolution.5 Moreover 
when it came to decolonization, Albert Camus’ more nuanced views, as 
well as his personal background as a pied noir, were used to tarnish his 
legitimacy, and, for some, this kind of smearing was effective. It was 
also part of how certain thinkers, particularly those on the radical left 
such as Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre played the zero sum 
game in France. To illustrate, Simone de Beauvoir offered one the best 
examples of this “acid tone” regarding Camus:
[. . .] I was revolted by Camus’ refusal to speak [about the torture 
of Henri Alleg]. He could no longer argue, as he had done during 
the war in Indochina, that he didn’t want to play the Communist’s 
game; so he just mumbled something about the problem not being 
understood in France. When he went to Stockholm to receive 
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his Nobel Prize, he betrayed himself even further. [. . .] In front 
of an enormous audience, he declared: ‘I love Justice; but I will 
fight for my mother before Justice,’ which amounted to saying 
that he was on the side of the pied noirs. The fraud lay in the fact 
that he posed at the same time as a man above the battle, thus 
providing a warning for those who wanted to reconcile this war 
and its methods with bourgeois humanism.6
It is essential to point out that de Beauvoir simply repeated the misquote 
of Camus, who really said, “People are planting bombings in the tram-
ways of Algiers. My mother might be on one of those tramways. If that 
is justice, then I prefer my mother.”7 The original misquote is attributed 
to Le Monde journalist, Dominique Birmann, who covered Camus while 
in Stockholm to receive his Nobel Prize and who inaccurately reported 
on the infamous December 12, 1957, incident. During this incident, 
Camus was rather discourteously heckled by an FLN representative at a 
gathering of Swedish students. Camus himself sent his own correction 
to this story, which was published on December 17, 1957, and noted the 
inaccurate accounting of what he said and explained that he also under-
stood the young Algerian’s “despair and unhappiness.”8
So, while I also must confess that I find Camus’ reluctance to engage 
in the Henri Alleg torture controversy surprising,9 I cite this particular 
and especially caustic passage of de Beauvoir’s memoirs, Hard Times, 
because it reveals a few assumptions held by radical anticolonialists in 
France, the most important being that Albert Camus, guided by ethics, 
could have and should distanced himself from the pieds noirs; that his 
refusal to align with intellectuals like Sartre and de Beauvoir on anti-
colonialism was symptomatic of “bourgeois humanism.” The fact that 
he did not embrace their radical anticolonial stance and remained on 
the side of the pieds noirs undermined his claims to represent ‘justice.’ 
Obviously, this is not how Camus thought, nor was it how he played 
the intellectual game in France by this time. To be sure, he was in fact 
a pied noir, but he was one the most vocal critics of an entrenched and 
uncompromising settler politics throughout the 1930s and 1940s, well 
before either Sartre or de Beauvoir took any interest in colonial issues. 
Hence, while de Beauvoir and Sartre played this vicious zero sum game 
out of the belief that they better understood the terms of the debate, 
the zero sum game regarding Algeria was neither fun nor frankly that 
relevant for Camus. The stakes, for him, were indeed real and personal. 
After all, was it wrong to be on the side of pieds noirs as inhabitants of 
French North Africa? 
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To be sure, Camus did not hold either Sartre or de Beauvoir in much 
esteem by this point, but the difference was that he kept most of his insults 
private. For example, in a letter written on May 26, 1959, to Jean Grenier, 
he described his contempt for France’s high and mighty anticolonials: 
The people of 14 juillet contest everything, indeed, except 
themselves and their own ideas. Yet that would be the most 
urgent thing to do. But the Left is so eager to change the world 
that they forget to look and see what it is and what it is becom-
ing. The result is that they make up the most backward district 
on the intellectual landscape and Paris smells provincial, very 
much so, because of these offensive lunatics. None of us loves 
truth enough. But at least we can make an effort. With them, no 
effort, their nature loathes truth. I have really suffered from this. 
But I could care less now, and my concerns are truly elsewhere.10
Camus did not deny the legitimacy of the public’s rightful outrage 
over French politics vis-à-vis Algeria—the military’s coup d’état that 
brought de Gaulle to power was, of course, problematical—he publically 
expressed his own outrage over the military abuses.11 He also openly 
chastised the political incompetency of French leaders throughout Al-
gerian Chronicles but did so only as means to work toward a legitimate 
solution to the current crisis. He had no patience for leftist abstractions 
about Marxism and radial anticolonialism during this era. 
The trick, therefore, with Albert Camus today is not to read his writings 
on Algeria as a dogmatic public thinker and writer, i.e., a player of the 
zero sum game, but instead as an anticolonial thinker. That seems easy 
enough. But the problem, of course, is that when dealing with a topic such 
as French anticolonialism and the Cold War (in the 1950s especially), we 
are dealing with an era that produced dogmatic thinking and zero sum 
postcolonial realities. It is full of clichés, stereotypes, utopian fantasies 
and, most importantly, violence. Nowhere was the zero sum game, with 
its baggage of clichés, more lethal than in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. 
Most historians view this event as the most violent war of national libera-
tion produced by the idea of anticolonialism, one that changed France 
and Algeria forever. In this war, the group to which Camus belonged, 
the French settlers of Algeria (the pied noir community) were the tragic 
losers, and in the abstractions and logic that many radical anticolonials 
sought to enforce, there was either very little room or no room at all for 
these European settlers in a postcolonial Algeria.
Nevertheless from 1954 to 1960 Camus tried to maintain his calm, to 
act rationally, to strive for peace, and ensure any dialogue he engaged in 
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with other writers about Algeria would be respectful and work towards a 
solution for his own community, for France, and for Algeria. He played 
an anticolonial game, but rationally, and he bet, like the contemporary 
economist John Nash, against the logic of a traditional zero sum game. 
The great insight of Nash, Camus’ contemporary and future fellow Nobel 
Laureate, was to re-imagine the zero sum game. Nash did so in 1950 
as a doctoral student at Princeton by advancing the simple and brilliant 
proposition: that each player makes moves independently but with the 
expectation that these moves remain rational and mutually beneficial. 
Camus thought about colonialism and morality in a similar fashion and 
believed that games ought not be ruled by the fallacies of a zero sum 
logic. Be that as it may, Camus’ hopes were to be disappointed, and the 
“Nash Equilibrium” (as it was later called) or something like it,12 could 
not be transposed onto Algeria, where each of the warring parties (es-
pecially the radical pieds noirs and the OAS) refused to act in mutually 
beneficial ways. The violence of the French military and the FLN had 
forced the war into the confines of a traditional zero sum game. Hence, 
each principal colonial and anticolonial player in the Algerian drama, the 
French State, the FLN, the OAS, etc., played a totalizing zero sum game 
with a terrifying logic of absolute violence. Moreover, it is vital to point 
out that for Camus, the war’s resolution in 1962 remained completely 
unthinkable (because there had never been a colonial exodus of this 
magnitude before), and from Camus’ perspective, mad; a history with 
no future, a time of unimaginable exodus.
The Sui GeneriS Bias: The TeleoloGy of radical anTicolo-
nism’s Zero sum Game
One of the biggest problems of this war for French intellectuals was 
the lack of consensus on what anticolonialism meant and the resulting 
partisan nature of this debate.13 The current and ongoing political invest-
ment in this history obviously creates problems for historical understand-
ing because we historians often view this war through the lens of a very 
simple unexamined bias that seems to exist sui generis. What is this sui 
generis bias? That radical anticolonialism was right, that the pieds noirs 
had no place in Algeria after independence, and that the radical, leftist 
anticolonial support for the FLN had proven to be on the right side of 
history. But does this phrase, in this instance mean anything? Do these 
violent wars of national liberation really have a “right side?” Was Camus 
really on the wrong side of history? 
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The problem, of course, is that the bias of the “right side” of a zero 
sum anticolonial game has in fact generated a particular and clear teleol-
ogy for understanding liberation during the French-Algerian War. Seeing 
the outcome (the exodus of pieds noirs in 1962) as inevitable, it directly 
affects how historians think about the decolonization of Algeria. To 
clarify, from the perspective of today, we know independence happened, 
we know that as a result roughly a million pieds noirs (including a very 
large Jewish population) were ferried to France across the Mediterranean 
in the summer of 1962 in a desperate panic. Yet this result, where Euro-
pean settlers frantically packed their suitcases (they were allowed only 
two!) was not in itself inevitable. Yes, it happened, but does that mean 
that the prophets of radical anticolonialism won the zero sum game? At 
the very least, the biases of their position obscure the actual historical 
contingencies of decolonization. 
This is not to suggest that I think Camus was always correct or that he 
fully understood the desire of FLN and its supporters to win liberation 
at all costs. I do not believe he ever came to terms with the FLN, and, 
as a result, criticisms of his shortcomings on this issue by anticolonial 
Algerian writers such as Mouloud Feraoun are quite valid, as are the 
criticisms of FLN partisans such as Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi.14 Yet, even 
though independence ended with the pieds noirs flight in 1962, one should 
not misread Camus’ efforts to propose an alternative outcome (as de 
Beauvoir would have it), as evidence of “bourgeois humanism,” which 
is to say of a colonist impulse. The evidence is in Camus’ writings, and 
the fact is that anticolonialism could have taken multiple paths during the 
decolonization of Algeria. Nowhere was it pre-determined that the pieds 
noirs were going to leave at the end of this war. Hence, Camus should 
not be read as being ‘morally wrong’ in working towards a solution that 
would have allowed for both Europeans and non-Europeans to continue 
living in Algeria together. 
The problem with understanding Camus on Algeria is that the outcome 
(the exodus) in many way sets up a reading of him that is framed by the 
results of a zero sum game. Consequently, Camus is often read backwards 
today, and knowing that the unprecedented exodus of European settlers 
happened, this historical knowledge tints readings of him. It is therefore 
hard to discuss this war and Camus’ unique position within it without 
writing to this end (the exodus). Therefore, the re-insertion of Albert 
Camus in a specific place and a specific time and without premonitory 
reference to the end of the war/the exodus is important because he, more 
than any other writer, makes us question historical (but not historicized) 
biases and consequently question end game of decolonization in Algeria. 
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In other words, accepting the results of the war as evidence of the moral 
and logical superiority of the radical anticolonial position (which is 
exactly how radical anticolonials in France like Sartre and de Beauvoir 
and even Frantz Fanon argued) it creates problems for historians, at least 
it did for me earlier in my career, because it diminishes our empathy for 
intellectuals like Camus who were settlers/pieds noirs and anticolonial 
à la fois. And there’s the rub. 
French radical anticolonialism is different from other forms of Euro-
pean anticolonialism and even different strains of nationalist thought. 
Writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre defended it as a matter of principle, 
regardless of the outcome, because the abstractions he used to justify 
his position were morally and theoretically consistent with his notions 
of socialist/Marxist revolutions and with the kind of liberation that these 
ideologies anticipated. Whereas, and quite importantly, Camus held no 
such faith in Sartre’s socialist/Marxist abstractions or in the type of radical 
anticolonialism that issued from these ideologies. Here it is extremely 
important to point out that by 1936 Camus had been disabused of the 
belief that Communism/Marxism was on the side of the oppressed and 
colonized Algerian nationalists, and he was in fact forced out of the 
French Communist Party (PCF) because, as he writes, he had recruited 
Algerian nationalists affiliated with the Etoile Norde Africaine to the 
PCF.15 It is also worth pointing out that it took another 20 years for one 
of the leading spokesman of anticolonialism, Aimé Césaire (author of 
Discourse on Colonialism), to break with the PCF because he had finally 
arrived at the same conclusions about communism and anticolonialism 
that Camus had in 1936, the conclusion being that the Communist Party 
was unresponsive to the anticolonial movement and indeed acting as a 
colonizing force itself.16
As a fervent anticolonial intellectual, Camus objected to how the ef-
fects of the zero sum game of radical anticolonialism—based in France 
on abstractions like Marxism and communism—would impact his own 
kin, the pieds noirs, and Algerians alike. So, rather than continue to 
play it, he chose silence because he was playing a different anticolonial 
game entirely, one like Nash’s, one in which moves would be mutually 
beneficial, rational, and based on reality rather than on an imagined 
Marxist dialectic. Camus believed there could be more than one winner 
of anticolonialism; rather than winner-take-all, his Algeria was home to 
pieds noirs and Algerians who might work together toward a common, 
non-violent world of equality and brotherhood. The zero sum game of 
radical anticolonialism, on the other hand, could not account for because 
it refused to accommodate place of the pieds noirs in this new (also 
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imagined) world rid of colonial injustices. Historians must thus suppress 
the idea of the inevitability of independence in order to account for the 
forces of historical contingency and see variations in the anticolonial 
positions, especially Camus’. 
It is crucial to keep in mind that that Albert Camus did not have the 
opportunity to reformulate his ideas. His untimely death in 1960 sealed 
his ideas and perhaps our views of them in the time capsule of permanent 
critique and in the logic of this very brutal war of national liberation, a 
logic that ultimately cast the pieds noirs (from the point of view of radi-
cal anticolonial thinkers) as colonialism’s reactionary losers and which 
also characterized Camus’ views as depassé. Hence, his critics’ labeling 
of his views as neo-colonial stuck to him, despite his efforts to shake 
those representations. Perhaps the time has come to open and explore 
the contents of this capsule, all the while recalling a self-observation 
Camus once made: “I don’t have the imagination to want to be someone 
else.”17 Indeed, since Camus confessed his limitations in this regard, it 
is crucial that we do our part in not trying to imagine him wishing to be 
other than who he was. 
The problem, of course, is that many of his closer friends and most 
vehement adversaries imagined that Camus should have wanted to be 
other than what he was precisely because he was a leading anticolonial 
writer, the most informed on the abuses of the French state and the 
colonial lobby in Algeria, and had stood for justice during WWII. His 
actions in this regard were heroic and unique. Perhaps only Simone Weil 
comes as close in tone to criticisms of French colonialism more generally 
during the interwar period. Hence, that his very vocal anticolonialism 
did not radicalize to accommodate the new nationalist conception of 
revolution that emerged after 1954 pained French anticolonialists. Their 
pain regarding his anticolonial views was intolerable to Camus. After the 
publication of The Rebel in 1951, when he criticized the sacred meta-
narratives of the French left, one of them being that revolutions liberate 
man, he quickly fell out favor with many wartime friends. Hostility was 
already palpable especially after the debate sparked by The Rebel, but 
after the Stockholm controversy in 1957, Camus was openly derided by 
many French intellectuals. He described the pain of this period in another 
letter to Grenier written on July 28, 1958: “As for me, I am finding it 
more and more difficult to live facing a wall. And difficult for an artist 
to work, alone, without being supported by anything.”18
As a reform-minded anticolonial who argued for an end to colonial 
domination but also for a future in Algeria where both European and 
non-European communities would work democratically together, Camus 
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refused to justify the extreme violence of the FLN, although he was ap-
palled by the repression of the French military. Re-reading Camus today, 
especially Algerian Chronicles, a sadness and an agony resonate in this 
moderate anticolonial position. To better illustrate the term “radical 
French anticolonialism,” imagine that Camus had been born in a different 
colonial setting, say in Southern Rhodesia or South Africa, where there 
were also large numbers of European settlers that went back generations. 
In this setting, it is doubtful that he would have been so violently attacked 
by the Left. In fact, an aparetheid government would have considered 
his open criticisms and calls for reform as anticolonial heresy. He may 
have, as did many Afrikaner writers who opposed apartheid, gone to jail 
for his criticisms of European abuses and could have been banned. For 
instance, Camus openly criticized the metropolitan government’s stupid 
and brutal repression of nationalists. His comments, if made against the 
Afrikaner regime, likely would have rendered him an anti-apartheid hero, 
like may South African writers who were banned and persecuted for their 
opposition to the status quo. Breyten Breytenbach (South African), Doris 
Lessing (Southern Rhodesian), Nadine Gordimer (South African), J. M. 
Coetzee (South African) and most especially André Brink (South African) 
come immediately to mind as European settlers with comparable politics 
and stature as writers. 
In fact, like Lessing, Camus opposed the colonial abuses of natives, 
wrote about these abuses, and left the colonial world because of its insti-
tutionalized racism and violence. (After all, he was asked to leave by the 
government in Algeria in 1940 because he was perceived to be a threat to 
its security as a journalist at Alger-Républicain, though he did return to 
Oran the next year, where he completed The Stranger). Why is it, then, 
that European settlers who opposed the abuses of the colonial system 
in Southern Africa are anticolonial, even though these same Europeans 
would have disputed that all settlers are bad and that they needed to leave 
with two suitcases? Not all committed anticolonial intellectuals of the 
same stature of Camus argued that all African nationalist movements 
deserved unqualified support or that all of their methods were acceptable. 
Yet these nuances are ignored in the case of Algeria and Camus. Why 
does a thinker of Camus’ notoriety, who is openly critical of the colonial/
settler status quo end up in such a quandary in which it was deemed of-
fensive by leftist French intellectuals to talk about his own origins as a 
pied noir intellectual? One of the great ironies, of course, is that while 
members of the French left like Sartre and de Beauvoir derided Camus 
for his origins, calm, and efforts to reconcile the European and non-
European populations in Algeria, Afrikaner writers struggled to achieve 
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the same kind of democratic and humane justice in South Africa (despite 
massive intimidation and threats). 
Consider the case of André Brink. In his memoir, A Fork in the Road, 
he writes:
And then there is Camus. Who promptly became, and still is, one 
of the Baudelairean phases of my life. I do not merely admire 
Camus, I love him. And one of the most profoundly moving 
pilgrimages of my life, move than twenty years after first read-
ing La peste, was to Lourmarin in the Vaucluse, to stand at the 
simple slab of his grave overgrown by rosemary in the uncom-
promising sun of Provence. Camus: the indefatigable persistence 
of Sisyphus, the revolt-without-end, the struggle, literally to 
death, against injustice, against the lie, against unfreedom. He 
provided not only a map for my exploration of Paris, of France, 
but a blueprint for the rest of my life.19
Like Camus, Brink openly criticized the racist and undemocratic regime 
that was destroying his country, and like Camus, Brink constantly re-
turned to fiction and essays, written in Afrikaans, as a weapon against 
apartheid and racism. Finally, like Camus, Brink never argued that in 
order to overcome colonialism the settlers (Afrikaners or any others) 
would have to accept the zero sum game that culminated in an exodus 
of whites from South Africa. 
Camus and Brink shared the same basic belief that Africans and Euro-
peans could live together in a postcolonial world of economic and racial 
equality. In fact, it is clear that Camus’ efforts to work towards justice 
and equality in Algeria, a justice and equality that did not eliminate the 
settlers/pieds noirs made perfect sense to Brink, who was studying lit-
erature in Paris as a graduate student during the French-Algerian War:
And then Camus, who had been my Bible, made vade mecum, 
died in that absurd car accident, at Pont-sur-Yonne, just north 
of Sens, on the highway to Paris, at 13:54 on 4 January, 1960. 
Just when the gloom of depression which had surrounded him 
ever since he received the Nobel Prize, and even before, seemed 
to be lifting; just as he seemed to be finding his way back into 
writing; just as life seemed to be becoming, if not meaningful 
by any means, but worthwhile again—that is, an absurdity worth 
living for—a wholly gratuitous death had the last word. For me, 
in those circumstances, at that moment in my life, nothing could 
have confirmed the significance of Camus in a more defini-
tive—more final—manner as his death. It lent a solemnity, even 
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a profundity, to every reading and rereading of Camus I made 
over the nearly fifty years that have passed since then. It meant 
that for the rest of my life I would never be without his shadow, 
or the shadow of his light. 
Seventeen years later another man died, with much the same 
devastating effect on my mind and my life, even though the man-
ner of it was totally different, and the circumstances incomparably 
so. This was Steve Biko. And in a curious way there was a line 
running from the first to the second.20
Like Camus, Brink did not believe that his compatriots in South Africa 
were a lost cause and that they could not be brought to reason. In fact, 
Brink deliberately used Afrikaans to express his dissident ideas. He 
needed to address his fellow Afrikaners in their own language. For Brink, 
change, real change, had to come from within. 
Likewise, for Camus, the pieds noirs had a chance in Algeria, a real 
chance, but they would have to accept equality and equal rights for all 
inhabitants of Algeria. As Camus explained in his article, “The Politi-
cal Malaise”: “But our Algerian policy is so distorted by prejudice and 
ignorance that to offer an objective account based on accurate informa-
tion is already to render an important service. That is what I intend to 
do . . .”21 The stakes were high:
In this lovely country, now glorious with spring blossoms and 
sunshine, people suffering from hunger are demanding justice. 
We cannot remain indifferent to their suffering, because we have 
experienced it ourselves. 
Rather than respond with condemnations, let us try to under-
stand the reasons for their demands and invoke on their behalf 
the same democratic principles we claim for ourselves.22 
We thus confront a puzzle: while an inspiration to an Afrikaner writer and 
staunch critic of apartheid like André Brink, Camus was dismissed and 
derided by French radical anticolonial intellectuals? In their defense, part 
of their criticism of Camus came from an honest lack of understanding 
about Camus’ anticolonial politics. His anticolonialism did not require 
the removal of the European settler, either by force or by choice from 
Algeria. Moreover, his refusal to see revolution as a panacea transcended 
the Algerian problem because, as he had already written in The Rebel, the 
revolutionary utopian impulse put aside facts to “remain faithful to the 
prophesy.”23 The difference between Camus and his radical anticolonial 
opponents is that he distrusted the revolutionary impulse and did not see 
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the necessity of coupling anticolonialism with a Marxist/socialist view 
of revolution. Hence his effort to decouple anticolonialism from revolu-
tion. From Camus’ perspective, revolutionary and radical anticolonialism 
was doomed to certain and bloody failure: “Every revolutionary ends 
by becoming an oppressor or a heretic. In the purely historical universe 
that they have chosen, rebellion and revolution end in the same dilemma: 
either police rule or insanity.”24
Camus foresaw Algeria’s path, and he grasped earlier than most the 
outcome of radical anticolonialism. Algeria did, in fact, become a police 
state after independence. The FLN dictatorship lasted for decades, and 
even today, the corrupt revolutionary-era elite that came to power after 
independence continues to rule the country through an oppressive and 
all-powerful police and military-security apparatus. There is no question, 
therefore, that on the level of historical postcolonialism, Camus’ predic-
tions were correct about where radical anticolonialism and the zero sum 
game it produced would take the country. 
By way of conclusion, let us measure the ethical chasm between Ca-
mus’ reformist anticolonialism and Sartre’s radical anticolonialism. In 
“Colonialism is a System,” first published in Les temps moderns (1956), 
Sartre writes: “I would like to put you on guard against what might be 
called ‘neocolonialist mystification.’ Neo-colonialists think that there 
are some good colonists and some very wicked ones, and that it is the 
fault of the latter that the situation of the colonies has deteriorated.”25 Not 
only must the French rid themselves of this delusion, Sartre exhorted, 
but they must also draw the proper lesson: 
Colonialism is in the process of destroying itself. But it still fouls 
the atmosphere. It is our shame; it mocks our laws and caricatures 
them. [. . .] Our role is to help it to die. Not only in Algeria but 
wherever it exists. People who talk about the abandonment of 
Algeria are imbeciles. There is no abandoning what we have 
never owned. [. . .] But above all let us not allow ourselves to be 
diverted from our task by a reformist mystification. The neoco-
lonialist is a fool who still believes that the colonial system can 
be overhauled—or a clever cynic who proposes reforms because 
he knows that they are ineffective.26
Camus’ reply to this zero sum logic comes in his essay, “A Clear Con-
science”:
The gulf between metropolitan France and the French of Algeria 
has never been wider. To consider the metropole first, it is as if 
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their long-overdue indictment of France’s policy of coloniza-
tion has been extended to all French living in Algeria. If you 
read certain newspapers, you get the impression that Algeria 
is a land of a million whip-wielding, cigar-chomping colonists 
driving around in Cadillacs. This is a dangerous cliché. To heap 
scorn on a million of our fellow Frenchmen or to quietly disdain 
them, indiscriminately blaming all for the sins of a few, can only 
hinder rather than encourage the progress that everyone claims 
to want [. . .] 
[. . .] Yet these same ordinary people are the first victims of 
the present situation. They are not the ones placing ads in the 
papers, looking at property to buy in Provence or apartments 
in Paris. They were born in Algeria and they will die there, and 
their hope is that they will not die in terror or be massacred 
in the pit of some mine. Must these hardworking Frenchmen, 
who live in isolated and rural towns and villages, be sacrificed 
to expiate the immense sins of French colonization? [. . .] It is 
easy to allow others to be sacrificed, and if the French of Algeria 
bear their share of responsibility, the French of France must not 
forget theirs either.27
Let us be clear: Camus did not desire the full independence of Algeria 
from France and he proposed a formal relationship between the two coun-
tries. As a public intellectual, he argued for a federated Algeria in which 
the pieds noirs would have a place. But privately, and again in a letter 
to his most trusted friend, Jean Grenier, Camus reveals he was resigned 
to a different future: “I believe as you do that it is undoubtedly too late 
for Algeria. I did not say that in my book because lo peor no es siempre 
seguro [sic] (the worst is not always a sure thing)—because historical 
randomness must have its chance—and because one does not write to 
say that everything is screwed up. In that case, one remains silent. I am 
preparing myself for that.”28
Did Camus’ complex stance on Algeria make him a neocolonist, as 
Sartre would have one believe? I think not. We have seen the consistency 
of his anticolonial positions, based on the conviction that a fair and equal 
democratic partnership between non-Europeans and Europeans in Algeria 
could be built. In Camus’ anticolonialist vision, there could be justice 
and equality for all men and women in Algeria—Muslims, Europeans, 
Jews, Berbers, and Arabs alike. His anticolonialism—like André Brink’s 
and the other “whites” who opposed apartheid as “whites” in South Af-
rica—would not have been a zero sum game anymore. Unfortunately, for 
Camus, this is how the game of decolonization is remembered because 
that is how it was played out, as a zero sum anticolonial game in Algeria. 
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